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• • • 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND Of CASE 
This action involves a dispute between plaintiff 
buyers and defendant sellers over enforcement of a Uniform 
Real Estate Contract, executed on March 14, 1973, involving 
approximately 13 acres of real property located in Salem, Utah, 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to a jury. The jury rendered a 
verdict for $600.00 for the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs submitted 
a $43,59.65 Memorandum of Costs and Disbursements. Defendants 
replied with a motion for taxation of costs by the court. 
The court taxed costs of $85.70 to defendants. Plaintiffs 
appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs seek a reversal of the sum taxed by 
the court as costs to defendants, and that the sum taxed 
as costs be set at that amount submitted in plaintiffs1 
Memorandum of Costs and Disbursements; or in the alternative 
that the case be remanded to District Court for a reconsidera-
tion of plaintiffs1 Memorandum of Costs and Disbursements. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On September 26, 1974, plaintiffs filed an action 
against defendants (R. 135). Plaintiffs alleged that on 
March 14, 1973, defendants entered into a real estate contract 
in which plaintiffs agreed to buy from defendants approxi-
mately 13 acres of property in Salem, Utah (R. 133). Entirely 
within the confines of these 13 acres was a small non-navi-
gable lake, stocked with fish (R. 98). Plaintiffs claim it 
was agreed defendants would remain as periodic tenants from 
month-to-month until April 1, 1974, or until April 1, 1975, 
or until Sixty (60) days after notice of termination was 
given on or after April 1, 1974 (R. 133). Plaintiff buyers 
claim their purchase included the fish in the lake (R. 134) . 
Plaintiffs claim defendants, some time after the 
purchase, but before defendant sellers surrendered possession, 
drained the lake and removed virtually all of the fish (R. 98). 
Plaintiff buyers also claim defendant sellers committed 
waste by the sellers1 failure to water the lawn and pasture; 
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and by the sellers1 failure to properly care for the house 
prior to the buyers' gaining possession (R. 134, 135). 
Counsel tried the case to jury on January 21, 1976 
and January 22, 1976 (R. 55, 57). The jury, in a special 
verdict, held the sellers did not remove fish from the pond 
(R. 58) and that at the time possession was surrendered by 
sellers to the buyers in accordance with the contract of 
sale, the reasonable cost of placing the property in the 
condition it was in on March 14, 1973, allowing for reason-
able wear and tear, would have been $600.00 (R. 59). 
Plaintiffs filed a Memorandum of Costs and Neces-
sary-Disbursements pursuant to Rule 54(d)(2), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure (R. 51, 52, 53, 54). Plaintiffs1 costs 
totalled $4,359.65 (R- 53). On January 30, 1976, defendants 
filed a motion for taxation of costs by the court (R. 47, 
48). The court, on February 4, 1976, ruled on defendants' 
motion to tax costs to defendants at $83.70. Plaintiffs 
appeal from this ruling. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE RULING OF THE COURT ON FEBRUARY 4, 1976 SHOULD BE 
VACATED BECAUSE IT VIOLATES THE RULES OF 
PRACTICE ADOPTED FOR THE COURTS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Defendants1 Motion for Taxation of Costs by the 
Court was clearly a motion objecting to plaintiffs1 Memorandum 
-3~ 
of Costs and Disbursements, Substantial legal questions 
were involved. For example: 
(1) Are attorneys1 fees part of costs to be 
awarded plaintiffs under the Uniform Real Estate Contract 
and its addendum and if so, what sum constitutes a reasonable 
attorneys1 fee to be awarded plaintiffs? 
(2) Are costs of witnesses who are subpoenaed 
but who do not appear for trial properly included in a Memo-
randum of Costs and Disbursements? 
(3) Are costs of plaintiffs1 deposition 
noticed by defendants properly included in a Memorandum of 
Costs and Disbursements and if so, what costs should be 
included? 
Defendants1 Motion involved legal questions for 
the court's consideration. Rule 2.8 of the Rules of Practice 
adopted in the District Courts of the State of Utah on 
September 15, 1975, and which became effective on January 
6, 1976, provides: 
(b) The responding party shall file and serve 
upon all parties within ten (10) days after service 
of the motion, a statement of answering points and 
authorities and couter affidavits. 
(c) The moving party may serve and file reply 
points and authorities within five (5) days after 
service of responding partyTs points and authori-
ties. Upon the expiration of such five (5) day 
period to file reply points and authorities, 
either party may notify the clerk to submit the 
matter for decision. 
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(e) In all cases where the granting of a motion 
would didpose of an action on the merits, with 
prejudice, the party resisting the motion may 
request oral argument, and such request should be 
granted unless the motion is denied. If no such 
request is made, oral argument shall be deemed 
to have been waived. 
The Utah Rules of Practice clearly provide that: 
(a) A responding party shall file a brief 
within ten (10) days. 
(b) A provision is made for a reply brief by 
movant. 
(c) After a reply brief either party may 
notify the clerk to submit the matter to the court for 
decision. 
It is elementary procedure that the party responding 
to a motion is accorded the courtesy of submitting a response 
prior to the courtfs entering a ruling. The court in the 
instant case ruled prematurely. It ruled prior to any response 
by plaintiffs. Such a ruling is manifestly unfair and arbi-
trary. How is it possible for the court to rule prior to 
hearing both sides? 
Defendants made a motion on January 30, 197 6 
(R. 47, 48). The court ruled on the motion on February 4, 
1976 (R. 38). Such a ruling should be Reversed because it 
violates the Rules of Practice adopted for the courts of the 
State of Utah. 
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POINT II 
THE COURT'S RULING IS ERRONEOUS BECAUSE IT IS PROPER 
TO ALLOW REASONABLE ATTORNEYS1 FEES INASMUCH AS THE 
UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT BETWEEN THE PARTIES 
CLEARLY PROVIDES FOR SUCH FEES AS PART OF PLAINTIFFS' COSTS 
The general rule is that attorneys' fees are not 
recoverable by successful litigants either in law or equity 
except where they are expressly provided for by contract. 
Bitney v. School District No. 44, 533 P.2d 1273 (Mont. 1975). 
This general rule has been stated by the Utah Supreme Court 
in numerous instances. See Quagliana v. Exquisite Home Builders, 
Inc., 538 P.2d 301 (1975); Alexander Dawson, Inc. v. Hydro-
ponics, Inc., 535 P.2d 1251 (1975) ;Pacific Coast Title Insurance 
Co. v. Hartford Accident § Indemnity Co., 7 Utah 2d 377, 325 
P.2d 906 (1958); Hawkins v. Perry, 122 Utah 597, 253 P.2d 372 
(1953); St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. Love, 57 Utah 450, 195 
P. 305 (1921) . The Utah Supreme Court in Blair Enterprises v. 
M-D Super Tire Market, Inc., 28 Utah 2d 192, 499 P.2d 1294 (1972) 
which involved an action to have a real estate purchase con-
tract declared unenforceable, said: 
The real estate purchase contract provides that 
the defaulting party shall pay all costs and 
expenses, including a reasonable attorneys' fee. 
Id. at 1295, 
Other jurisdictions have also affirmed this rule. See 
Seliinger v. Freeway Mobile Home Sales, Inc., 110 Ariz. 573, 
521 P.2d 1119 (1974); Communications Workers of America, 
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AFL-CIO, Local 6005 v. Jackson, 516 P.2d 529 (Okla. 1973); 
Adamson v. Thrall, 513 P.2d 1157 (Ore. 1973). 
As authority for allowing attorneys' fees, plain-
tiffs cite analogous instances involving contractual disputes 
as to real estate transactions in which the contract of sale 
made an express provision for reasonable attorneys' fees. 
In Pearson v. Sigmund, 503 P.2d 702 (Ore. 1972), 
sellers brought suit for an injunction against further cut-
ting and removal of timber under a contract of sale of the 
timber. The seller also demanded payment of $10,000.00 
allegedly due under a contract. After issuance of a prelimi-
nary injunction, the buyer filed a counterclaim for damages, 
including attorneys1 fees, for the issuance of a wrongful 
injunction and for breach of contract. The Oregon Supreme 
Court held that where the contract for the sale of timber 
provided for attorneys' fees to the prevailing party in a 
suit, the trial court had no right to disregard the terms 
of the contract and was required to allow reasonable attor-
neys' fees to the buyers. The court said: 
. . . Because of the contract provision for attorney 
fees to the prevailing party, however, the trial 
court had no right to disregard the terms of the 
contract and was required to allow reasonable 
attorney fees to defendants as the prevailing 
parties in this case. Gorman, et ux. v. Jones, 
et ux., 232 Or. 416, 420, 375 P.2d 821 (1962). 
Id. at 706. 
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Also see Turner v. Wexler, 14 Wash. App. 143, 538 P.2d 877 
(1975) as authority supporting allowance of attorneys1 fees 
if the contract provides for reasonable attorneys1 fees if 
any action is Tfbrought to enforce any of the terms of this 
agreement or forfeit the same." 
In Kammert Bros. Enterprise, Inc. v. Tanque Verde 
Plaza Co., 102 Ariz. 301, 428 P.2d 678 (1967) which involved 
an action by the purchaser for damages for the alleged breach 
of a real estate agreement, the Supreme Court of Arizona 
stated: 
Finally the seller claims that an amount of 
$7,500 as attorneys* fees should not be allowed 
in an action for breach of the contract. Such 
fees may be allowed when the contract so provides. 
Colvin v. Superior Equipment Company, 96 Ariz. 
113, 392 P.2d 778 (1964); Commercial Standard 
Insurance Co. v. Cleveland, 86 Ariz. 288, 345 P.2d 
210 (1959). The contract provided: 
"If any suit shall be brought by either 
party to enforce or cancel this contract, 
the prevailing party to said suit shall 
be entitled to recover all costs and 
expenses necessarily incurred by him in 
connection therewith, including a 
reasonable attorney's fee to be fixed 
by the court." 
We believe that the words "to enforce or cancel" 
the contract are broad enough to encompass the present 
action. This suit can be construed as the buyer?s 
means of enforcing its rights under the contract. 
Provisions of this type should be given a broad 
meaning rather than a narrow and restrictive one, 
Leventhal v. Krinsky, 325 Mass. 336, 90 N.E.2d 
545, 17 A.L.R.2d 281 (1950). Id. at 685 
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The Uniform Real Estate Contract in the instant 
case had a clause providing for attorneys1 fees as costs. 
Paragraph 21 of the Contract states (R. 128): 
The Buyer and Seller each agree that should 
they default in any of the covenants or agree-
ments contained herein, that the defaulting 
party shall pay all costs and expenses, including 
a reasonable attorneyTs fee, which may arise or 
accrue from enforcing this agreement, or in 
obtaining possession of the premises covered hereby, 
or in pursuing any remedy provided hereunder or 
by the statutes of the State of Utfth whether 
this remedy is pursued by filing a suit or 
otherwise. (Emphasis added.) 
Paragraph 10 of defendants1 pleading in answer 
to plaintiffs* Complaint contains a party admission that the 
Real Estate Contract of Sale provides fpr an award of costs 
"together with a reasonable attorney*s jfee as provided for 
in paragraph twenty-one of the contract . . ." (R. 126). 
Plaintiffs in the instant case prayed for attorneys* fees in 
their original Complaint (R. 135). 
To protect the buyers f property rights to take 
possession of their property in as good a condition as it 
was on March 14, 1973, excepting normal wear and tear it 
became necessary for plaintiff buyers to hire counsel and 
bring an action at law. 
Utah Code Ann. §78-38-2 also prohibits the com-
mitting of waste by a tenant in possession of real property. 
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Plaintiffs also sought a remedy under this statute by 
a lawsuit. 
The jury was asked the following question and 
answered thus (R. 50): 
3. At the time possession of the property 
involved in this action was surrendered to the 
Cluffs in accordance with the Contract of Sale, 
what was or would have been the reasonable cost 
of then placing the property in the condition 
it was in on or about March 14, 1973, allowing 
for reasonable and ordinary wear and tear from 
that time to the time of the surrender? 
Answer: $600.00. 
The jury thus found defendants, while in lawful 
possession of plaintiffs' real property, clearly caused 
a diminishment in value beyond the normal wear and tear. 
Whether such impairment committed by the Culmers be classi-
fied as waste may be relevant to whether the damages should 
be trebled under U.C.A. §78-38-2, but it is not relevant to 
the question of whether attorneys1 fees in the instant 
case are a part of the costs. It is not relevant because 
the buyers, under the contract, have a right to possession 
after their property has been diminished only by ordinary wear 
and tear. 
Under the terms of the Uniform Real Estate Contract, 
the intentions of both parties are clearly and expressly 
stated that, if either of the parties defaulted or if it was 
necessary to pursue a remedy afforded by the contract (such 
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as the right to prohibit the seller from willfully damaging 
the property), then the party at fault was to pay nall costs 
and expenses, including a reasonable attorney's fee, which may 
arise or accrue from enforcing this agreement or pursuing any 
remedy provided by statute of the State of Utah." The sellers1 
destructive acts resulted in an attempt by the buyers to enforce 
the agreement. Plaintiffs' filing of a Complaint was an 
attempt to enforce the terms of the real estate contract. 
Defendants are contractually obligated to plaintiffs 
for reasonable attorneys^ fees as a part of the costs. The 
court, in its ruling of February 4, 1976, did not have any 
right to disregard the terms of the contract, and must allow 
reasonable attorneys' fees as a part of costs to plaintiff 
buyers. 
POINT III 
THE COURT'S RULING ON FEBRUARY 4, 1976 IS ERRONEOUS 
BECAUSE THE AMOUNT OF ATTORNEYS1 FEES SUBMITTED IN 
IN PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM OF COSTS 
AND DISBURSEMENTS IS REASONABLE 
There exists no single factor determining whether 
attorneys' fees in a given case are reasonable. Whether 
such fees are reasonable is a fact question determinable under 
the peculiar circumstances of each case. Such factors are 
aptly summarized in an annotation at 58 A.L.R.3d 201, §2, 
entitled "Amount of Attorneys' Compsnation in Matters 
Involving Real Estate": 
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It is a generally accepted rule that in the 
absence of a controlling contract, statute or rule 
of court, an attorney is entitled to the reasonable 
value of services performed for his client, and that 
the reasonableness of the fee is determined by 
consideration of a number of factors. The most common 
factors are generally considered to be the time and 
effort required, the novelty or difficulty of issues, 
the skill and standing of counsel, the value of 
interest involved, the results secured, ttie loss of 
opportunity for other employment, the ability to 
pay of the person charged, customary charges for 
similar services, and the certainty of payment. 
Notwithstanding general agreement by the courts on 
the underlying principles, an examination of rele-
vant case law suggests that the various criteria 
are accorded varying degrees of significance 
depending upon the nature of the services rendered 
by the attorney. Id. at 207, 208 
Also see Insurance Company of North America v. Omaha Paper Stock, 
Inc., 189 Neb. 232, 202 N.W.2d 188 (1972) 
. . . The amount involved in this case was $29,000 
and attorneys1 fees in the sum of $10,000 were 
allowed and taxed to appellant. "The amount 
allowed rests in the sound discretion of the dis-
trict court, considering the elements of the 
amount involved, the responsibility assumed, the 
questions of law raised, the time and labor 
necessarily required in [the] performance of 
duties, the professional diligence and skill 
required, and the result of the services performed." 
Stephens v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 182 Neb. 562, 156 
N.W.2d 133. Id. at 191 
A common-sense approach followed by numerous courts 
on the question of reasonableness of attorneys1 fees is to 
base the fee awarded as costs on the hours of work done by 
counsel in preparation for trial and actual trial time. In 
Waggoner v. Oregon Automobile Insurance Co., 526 P.2d 578 
(Ore. 1974), the lessor-owner of a grocery store brought an 
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action for declaratory judgment against the lessee-operator 
of the store, seeking to enforce an indemnity provision of 
the lease. The Oregon Supreme Court said the amount of attor-
neys1 fees to be allowed in both an action at law and a suit 
in equity is a question of fact. The Oregon court said: 
The award by the trial c 
fees for the trial and app 
that matter was presented 
decision in this case, was 
determination of the amoun 
required for the trial and 
what would be a reasonable 
a trial and appeal, in the 
difficulty of the case, th 
the result obtained, among 
omitted.) 
ourt of $9,250 in attorney 
eal of the original case, as 
to the trial court for 
based implicitly upon its 
t of time reasonably 
appeal of that case and 
charge per hour for such 
light of the nature and 
e amount involved, and 
other things. (Citations 
Under these facts and circumstanc 
cannot properly set aside an award 
fees by a trial court which is bas 
tial competent evidence. (Citati 
es, this court 
of attorney 
ed upon substan-
omitted.) ons 
The trial court was also in a be 
than this court to consider the cr 
tter position 
edibility of the 
testimony offered by defendants and to consider the 
amount of time reasonably required for the trial 
and appeal of the original case, and a reasonable 
charge per hour for such time, as well as other 
factors to be considered in the determination and 
award of a reasonable attorney fee for both the 
trial and appeal of the original case and for the 
trial of this case. 
It would appear that the award by the trial court 
would compensate plaintiffs1 attorneys for the 
amount of work devoted by them, according to their 
time records, at a rate of between $55 and $40 per 
hour. We cannot say that an award of attorney fees 
based upon such an hourly charge for the defense 
of a personal injury case by an insurance company 
or in an action for indemnity between insurance 
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companies was excessive. On the contrary we hold 
that the award by the trial court was supported 
by substantial, competent evidence. Id. at 582 
(emphasis added). 
The case of Newbern v. Gas-Ice Corporation, 501 
P.2d 1294 (Ore. 1972) involved an award of $6,000 attorneys1 
fees for 132 hours of work in an action against a corporation 
for payments allegedly due under a lease of property. Error 
was claimed in assessing the $6,000 attorneys1 fees. The 
Oregon Supreme Court stated: 
Defendant's final contention is that "the trial 
court erred in assessing $6,000 attorneys1 fees 
against Gas-Ice." 
The parties stipulated on trial that the trial 
judge might "set attorneys' fees without the neces-
sity of a presentation of evidence." Plaintiff's 
attorneys estimated, however, that they devoted 132 
hours of work on this case, although they did not 
maintain time records to support that estimate. 
The award of $6,000 was indeed a liberal allowance 
of attorney fees in this case, particularly when 
made to attorneys who were unable to support a 
request for a larger allowance by records showing 
the amount of time devoted by them to his case. 
Because of the increasingly high cost of legal 
services today, in keeping with the increase in 
cost of other goods and services, attorneys are 
ordinarily expected to keep time records of their 
work for the purpose of billing clients for most 
types of legal services as well as for the purpose 
of justifying the amount of attorney fees to be 
awarded by the courts in cases in which such awards 
are proper. Nevertheless, the time devoted by an 
attorney is not the only factor to be considered 
in determining what is a reasonable attorney 
fee. See Code of Professional Responsibility, 
DR 2-106 CB) and Annot., 145 A.L.R. 672, 678; 56 
A.L.R.2d 15, 20. 
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Considering such additional fact|ors as the diffi-
culty and complexity of the issues involved in this 
case, the value of the interests involved, the 
result secured, the skill and eminence of opposing 
counsel and the professional standing of counsel 
for plaintiff, as well as the estimate by plaintifffs 
counsel of the amount of time devoted by them to 
this case, we cannot say that there was not a proper 
basis for the allowance by the trial court of $6,000 
in attorney fees, particularly in view of the stipu-
lation by the parties. Id. at 129|7. 
In Kay v. Biggs, 13 Ariz.App. 172, 475 P.2d 1 (1970) 
the court held an award of attorneys' fees of $750 to plain-
tiff in a quiet title action for attorneysf time of 21.9 
hours was reasonable. 
In Billinger v. Jost, 510 S.W.2d 57 (Mo. 1974), a 
partition suit, it was held that attorneysf fees and expenses 
of $1,945 based upon 52-1/2 hours at $35.00 per hour, plus 
$150.00 expenses was reasonable. In Evans v. Scottsdale 
Plumbing Co., 10 Ariz.App. 184, 457 P.2d 724 (1969), a mort-
gage foreclosure action, the court said|: 
Appellants next contend that the award of the 
trial court for attorneys' fees wa|s excessive. The 
evidence relative to attorneys' fees was presented 
at the hearing held on December 15i, 1967. This 
Court has examined the transcript of evidence sub-
mitted at that hearing and finds that there is 
substantial evidence to support thje award and that 
the trial court was fully justified in awarding 
plaintiff attorneys' fees in the ajmount of $8,500. 
Extensive evidence was introduced as to the nature, 
amount and value of the legal services rendered. 
The number of hours expended exceeded 300, exclu-
ding services in connection with tjhe prior default 
and appeal in this matter. An award by trial court 
for attorneys' fees is tested in tjhe same manner as 
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any other judgment, and when there is substantial 
evidence to support it, it is our duty to affirm 
the award. (Citations omitted.) Id. at 729. 
The amount awarded for attornys? fees is not 
necessarily unreasonable because the sum exceeds the amount 
recovered by plaintiff. In Humphries v. Puritan Life 
Insurance Company, 311 S.2d 534 (La.App. 1975) a suit was 
filed to recover under a student accident policy. The court 
entered judgment awarding the insured $550, together with 
penalties and attorneysf fees of $1,500. The court said: 
Puritan seeks a decrease, and the plaintiff an 
increase, in the $1,500 awarded as plaintiffTs 
attorneyfs fee. The amount awarded rests 
largely with the discretion of the trial 
judge. Niles v. American Bankers Insurance 
Company, 220 S.2d 435 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1970). 
Although the attorney's fee awarded exceeds 
the actual award plus penalties, we find no 
abuse of discretion. The award is sufficient 
to recompense plaintiff's attorney for 
services related to this appeal. Id. at 
539. 
In Taylor v. Jones, 276 S.2d 130 (Ala. 1973), 
involving the collection of a note, the Supreme Court of 
Alabama held: 
. . . a fee greatly exceeded the amount of 
principal and interest on the original obliga-
tions, the fee is not so excessive as to pro-
nounce error in the allowance accepted by the 
trial court." 
In Scott v. Travelodge Corporation, 71 Cal.Rptr. 547 (1968) 
the lessor brought an action against the lessee to recover 
rent due under a lease. The judgment awarded only $886.55 
as delinquent rental. The court said: 
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Appellant's objection to the award of attor-
neys1 fees is without substantial merit. The 
judgment awarded only $886.55 as delinquent 
rental; the plaintiffs sued for $12,916.52, and 
the trial itself lasted four days. Testimony 
showed that the bill of counsel for plaintiffs 
to their clients for services rendered to March 
21, 1966 was $2,335 and that a further charge of 
$300 per day would be made for the time occupied 
by the trial. The determination of the recover-
able fee was a question of fact within the dis-
cretion of the trial court. (6 Cal.Jur.2d Rev., 
Attorneys at Law, §101, pp. 169-172.) The 
judgment is affirmed. Id. at 550, 551 
The case of Commercial Credit Corporation v. Wallgast, 
11 Wash.App. 117, 521 P.2d 1191 (1975) involved an action for 
a deficiency judgment allowed by the court pursuant to the 
terms of a security agreement. It was objected that the 
allowance of $1,225 for attorneys' fees on a recovery of 
$1,335.50 was excessive. The court said: 
. . . Whether attorney's fees are reasonable is 
a question of fact to be decided in light of the 
circumstances of each individual case. The trial 
court has broad discretion in making this award. 
In re Renton v. Dillingham Corp., 79 Wash.2d 374, 
485 P.2d 613 (1971). "Discretion is abused only 
where no reasonable man would take the view 
adopted by the trial court." Jankelson v. Cisel, 
3 Wash.App. 139, 142, 473 P.2d 202, 205 (1970). 
In allowing $1,225 on a recovery of $1,335.50 
the trial judge considered the attorney's time and 
the hourly rates prevailing in this area. He 
considered as well the fact that defendant put 
up a "substantial fight on the small amount." 
. . . Id. at 1197. 
To some extent at least attorney's fees should be 
based upon the amount recovered, but it is only one among many 
-17-
factors, and appellants have been unable to discover any cases 
holding the fees must have any necessary relationship to the 
amount awarded. 
In Kuykendall v. Malernee, 516 P.2d 558 (Okl.App. 
1973), the court held that $600 awarded as attorneys1 fees 
in an action on a consumer loan was inadequate considering 
the nature and extent of services rendered by the attorney and 
the fact that a contested trial was involved and briefs were 
submitted on the issue of damages. 
The reasonable value of services performed by the 
attorney in a given case is a question of fact determined in 
the light of the particular circumstances of the case. Colbath 
v. Colbath, 516 P.2d 763 (Ore.App. 1973). The test is whether 
the amount awarded is fairly supported by evidence of services 
rendered. Realty West, Inc. v. Thomas, 95 Id. 262, 506 P.2d 
830 (1973). The Utah Supreme Court in Blair Enterprises, 
supra, stated: 
. . . This court has held unless the parties agree 
otherwise, the court is obliged to take evidence 
on the issue of the reasonableness of the attorney's 
fee and to make findings thereon. Provo City Corp. 
v. Cropper, 27 Utah 2d 1, 497 P.2d 629 . . . Id. at 
1295. 
Plaintiffs, in the instant case, are seeking attorneys1 
fees of approximately $4,000.00 based upon time records sup-
porting approximately 80 hours of legal work. In Newbern, 
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supra, $6,000.00 attorneys1 fees were allowed as reasonable for 
132 hours of legal work. In Kay, supra, $750.00 attorneys1 
fees were allowed for 21.9 hours of legal work. In Evans, 
supra, $8,500.00 attorneys' fees were allowed for 300 hours of 
legal work. In Billinger, supra, $1,945.00 attorneys' fees 
were allowed for 52-1/2 hours of legal work. Four thousand 
dollars sought by plaintiff in the instant case is reasonable 
when compared with the above cases. 
POINT III 
THERE EXISTS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE PRESENTED TO THE COURT 
TO SUPPORT A SUM OF $4,091.25 ALLOWED AS ATTORNEYS' FEES 
A party such as the plaintiffs in the instant case 
has the burden of making a prima facie Showing of the reason-
ableness of the fee under the circumstances of the case. 
Quarngesser v. Quarngesser, 177 S.2d 875 (Fla. 1965). Plain-
tiffs have easily met this minimal burden by submitting a 
verified, detailed itemization in their cost bill of the 
dates and amounts of time expended. This detailed itemization 
has been extracted directly from the record in counsel's 
office of legal charges incurred by plaintiffs. Plaintiffs 
have cited numerous cases as authority for the reasonableness 
of the amount of $4,091.25 as attorneys' fees. Plaintiffs 
have therefore made a substantial showing of the reasonable-
ness of the fee under the circumstances of the case. 
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In fixing a reasonable amount of attorneys1 fees, 
the judge is more or less an expert in his own right. Wegmann 
v. Suggs, 147 S.2d 263 (La. 1962). The taking of proof is not 
essential to the allowance of attorneys f fees when allowed by 
the trial judge since ordinarily he would not need the opinion 
of an attorney as to what would be reasonable attorneys1 fees 
since he is an attorney himself. The trial court has authority 
to fix reasonable attorneys1 fees in the absence of expert 
testimony and to establish the value of services where the 
services are rendered under the eye of the court. Caldwell v. 
Trans-Gulf Petroleum Corporation, 311 S.2d 80 (La.App. 1975). 
The Utah Supreme Court in F.M.A. Financial Corporation 
v. Build, Inc., 17 Utah 2d 80, 404 P.2d 670 (1965) held that an 
award of attorneys' fees must be based upon evidence. The 
evidence in the instant case is the verification by the 
attorney of record of the correctness and necessity of the Memo-
randum of Costs and Disbursements (R. 54). Such an affidavit 
was not controverted by defendant. This affidavit is sufficient 
along with the numerous cases cited by plaintiffs to establish 
the reasonableness of $4,091.21, the sum plaintiffs seek as 
attorneys1 fees. 
CONCLUSION 
The ruling on February 4, 1976 to tax costs to 
defendants at $85.70 violated the Rules of Practice because 
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the court had ruled before plaintiffs had responded. The 
ruling thus violated an elementary canon of practice, inas-
much as a ruling can obviously only occur after the court has 
listened to both positions. The ruling was procedurally defective 
The ruling was also substantively defective because 
the uniform real estate contract between the parties provided 
for reasonable attorneys1 fees accruing from enforcing the 
agreement. Buyers, by filing a suit and prevailing, were 
attempting to enforce their contractual right to possess the 
property from the sellers, undiminished in value except for 
normal use. The amount of attorneys1 fees submitted in plain-
tiffs1 Memorandum of Costs and Disbursements was reasonable. 
The sum was reasonable when judged by other cases. The veri-
fication by the attorney of record required by Rule 55(d)(2), 
U.R.C.P., as to the correctness and necessity of the Memorandum 
of Costs and Disbursements, is sufficient evidence. This is 
especially true when plaintiffs' affidavit, as in the instant 
case, was uncontroverted by defendants. 
The court's ruling on February 4, 1976 is erroneous. 
Plaintiffs1 Memorandum of Costs and Disbursements should be 
allowed, or should be remanded for a reconsideration of costs. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HATCH § PJ.UMB 
By
 c 
Orrin G. Hatch 
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